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Using a newly developed database for 8 transition economies, this paper examines whether
reforms and political freedom are important for foreign bank entry. The paper provides strong
evidence that foreign bank entry positively responds to reform measures. We also find some
evidence for the importance of political freedom. The size of the financial sector and the
openness of a country appear to be important determinants of a country’s willingness to attract
foreign banks. Moreover, we find that reforms significantly affect foreign bank entry via the
efficiency of the financial sector, the structure of the financial sector and by stimulating
domestic investment.
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The growing presence of foreign-owned financial institutions during the 1990s is one of the most
striking structural changes in the financial systems of the countries in transition. Currently, on
average 60 per cent of the total number of banks is in foreign hands. In some Central Eastern
European (CEE), South Eastern European (SEE) and Baltic countries, the share of foreign bank
assets relative to total assets of the banking system is even more than 75% (Bol et al., 2002).This
‘takeover’ has occurred within a period of less than ten years. Given the high and growing share
of foreign bank ownership, there is a growing need for studies on the reasons for foreign bank
entry in transition economies. The existing literature on foreign bank entry mainly deals with
Western European countries, or with the US (Buch, 2000). There are only a few studies focusing
on transition economies, but they only consider one country, or a small group of countries (e.g.
Galac and Kraft, 2000, for Croatia, and Konopielko, 1999, for the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland).
In this paper we examine the reasons for foreign bank entry in transition economies. The
goal of this paper is to test whether reforms and political freedom in a group of transition
economies have positively contributed to foreign bank entry. We also examine via which
channels reforms affect foreign bank entry. In our view, these issues are of utmost importance for
policymakers in transition economies who are aiming to attract foreign banks. It may seem
obvious that reforms have an important effect on foreign bank entry. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there are no empirical papers available that have explicitly addressed this issue. We
find strong evidence for the importance of reforms for foreign bank entry. Also political freedom
seems to be important, although in some of the regressions political freedom does not
significantly affect foreign bank entry. Moreover, the estimates suggest that reforms affect
foreign bank entry by enhancing the efficiency of the financial sector, by changing the structure
of the financial sector, and by stimulating domestic investments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the literature on
determinants of foreign bank entry. Section 3 discusses the data set. Section 4 contains the




Why do banks go abroad? There is no unambiguous theory to explain foreign bank entry.
Nevertheless, several reasons are put forward in the literature (Buch, 2000, Focarelli and Pozzolo,
2000, Konopielko, 1999). The main reason for foreign bank entry seems to be the ‘follow the
customer’ principle, otherwise called the defensive expansion hypothesis (Williams, 2002).
According to this view, a bank follows its customer’s abroad to support its already existing
relationship in the new country. A second reason why a bank might go abroad is because of the
attractiveness of the host market. The market of the host country offers new opportunities to make
money. The literature comes up with some other reasons as well, but they have not been
mentioned in the context of transition economies. For instance, imitation of competitors, i.e. a
multinational bank opens a branch in a specific country because another multinational did
likewise. A reduction of the (capital) costs is another reason: internalisation gives a bank the
opportunity to perform arbitrage. Moreover a multinational bank has access to worldwide capital
sources. Finally, foreign banks may decide to go abroad in order to diversify financial risks
(Canals, 1997).
Another approach, that partly includes the five reasons mentioned above, to explain
foreign bank entry is based on the eclectic paradigm, introduced by Dunning (e.g., Dunning,
2001). Within this paradigm, advantages of foreign bank entry are based on three different
theories. These are 1)  advantages, based on the comparative advantages of the
foreign bank; 2)  advantages and 3) incentives related to  Ownership-
specific advantages refer to e.g. access to the endowments of the parent company at costs below
market price, management skills, image, and existing bank-client relations. Location advantages
are, for example, barriers to trade, institutional arrangements, and the financial situation of the
host country. The incentives related to  are advantages of multinational enterprises
derived from the possibility of limiting the costs of market failures by carrying out a share of their
transactions within the boundaries of the firm.1
 #$%# %&'( )*
It is not so easy to test the various theoretical arguments for foreign bank entry outlined in the
previous section. Several determinants have been suggested in the literature (e.g. Buch, 2000,
                                                          
1
 More details on the theories of foreign bank entry can be found in, for example, Focarelli and Pozzolo
(2000), Dunning (2001) and Williams (1997).
3Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2000)2. One set of suggested determinants relate to the performance of a
domestic financial sector, measured by indicators such as the return on equity, the net interest
margin, overhead costs, and after tax income. To be expected is a positive relation between
foreign bank entry and a good performance of the domestic banking sector. Other examples are:
the size of the financial system of the host country (total assets, private credit, central bank assets,
concentration ratio), again a positive relation can be expected; information costs (distance from
home country, common language, legal system, country risk, culture); regulations (degree of
freedom in banking), and the presence of an international financial centre. Finally, several macro
economic indicators are also used to proxy the attractiveness of the host country (GDP,
population, FDI, investment rate, export of host country).
A potential problem with many of these variables is that the causality may go in the other
direction. For instance, more foreign bank entry may enhance the overall efficiency of the
banking sector. There is quite some evidence for transition countries that foreign banks are, on
average, more efficient than domestic banks (see Bol et al., 2002). Likewise, as foreign banks are
more oriented towards the private sector than domestic banks, foreign bank entry may affect the
level of domestic investment (Bol et al., 2002). Another problem with some of the variables is
that is not always clear which hypothesis they proxy. For instance, does a positive relation
between FDI and foreign bank entry support the ’follow the customer’ argument, or does it reflect
the attractiveness of the new market?
Table 1 summarizes the existing literature on the determinants of foreign bank entry for
Central Eastern European countries, South Eastern European countries and the Baltics. Some
studies are based on bank-level data, where reasons of foreign bank entry are obtained by means
of questionnaires (Galac and Kraft, 2000, Hoskova and Vagnerova, 1998, Konopielko 1999).
Other studies use macro data (Konopielko 1999, Mathieson and Roldos, 2001).
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 The study by Buch (2000) refers to reasons for German banks to go abroad, while Focarelli and Pozzolo
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Main motive: ‘winning the best clientele’ large companies,
foreign investors
Advantages of Slovak banking market:











47 (total number is
53) foreign and
domestic banks.
Reasons for coming and staying:
Following existing clients/ doing business with home
country clients.
Activities: Focused on large companies.
6The table suggests that the main motive of foreign banks to become active in Central and
Eastern European countries is the perceived need to support the client base, ‘following the
existing clients’ (Konopielko, 1999, Galac and Kraft, 2000).
However, these conclusions cannot be generalized since the existing empirical
literature concentrates on only a few transition countries: Poland, Czech Republic and
Hungary. Furthermore, most literature is rather ad hoc, both in terms of theory (i.e. the model
specification) and in terms of methodology.Moreover, it is remarkable that none of the papers
has addressed the importance of political freedom and economic reforms. Transition
economies are in a process from a communist plan economy to a democratic market
economy. The degree to which this has taken place, i.e. the level of political freedom and
economic reforms, are probably important considerations for foreign banks to enter one of
these countries. For instance, countries that successfully established safe, transparent and
enforceable rules for financial markets are probably attractive for foreign banks. Moreover,
foreign ownership requires privatization. In addition, the removal of entry barriers,
memberships of WTO and enterprises operating according to western ‘standards’ with respect
to financial structure, corporate control etc., makes the market more attractive for foreign
banks.
+   
A main problem with respect to research on foreign banking for transition economies is that
many important variables are lacking. This holds also for our study, to some extent.
Nevertheless, we succeeded in developing a relatively comprehensive data set. By
approaching Central Banks in transition countries and by using the existing data published by
the IMF, Worldbank and the EBRD in their country reports we were able to come up with a
relatively sophisticated database. It contains indicators for the development of the countries in
general and the financial sector in particular. Moreover, it provides information on the
structure and performance of the financial system. This paper uses a selection of variables
from this database.3 For a complete list of data sources and variable definitions, see the
Appendix.
The set of countries include Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. The selection of these countries is mainly based on data
availability for our foreign bank entry variable. The data refer to the 1992-2000 period. Since
the years for which data are available differ per country, the estimates are done for an
unbalanced panel. For all variables in the estimates we take the logarithm to better account for
possible heteroskedasticity problems.
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 See Bol et al. (2002) for further details. The database is available on request.
7The database distinguishes two indicators for foreign bank entry. The first indicator is
the ratio between the total value of assets of foreign4 deposit money5 banks divided by the
value of assets of all banks (!"#$%&. The second indicator is the total number of foreign
banks divided by the total number of banks ('"#$%&. From both indicators we take the
logarithm (("#$%and ('"#$%, respectively), and construct an overall indicator for foreign
bank entry by performing a principal components analysis on (!"#$% and ('"#$% The
principal components analysis strongly suggests that there is one dominant factor (the
proportion of the total variance explained by one component equals 0.97). The factor loading
are 0.48 for ('"#$%and 0.875 for (!"#$%. Since the resulting foreign bank entry indicator
("%')) is highly correlated with both ('"#$%and (!"#$% (correlation coefficients of
0.996 and 0.956 with (V"#$% and ('"#$%, respectively) and since (!"#$% and ('"#$%
are also highly correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.924) we only present regressions in
which "%')is the dependent variable (see section 4).
Table 2 gives some data on the bank indicators for our sample of countries. The data
refer to 1999, the latest year for which data where available for all countries. Note that
"%') is based on a the logarithm of !"#$% and '"#$%Our data show that Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic score high on all indicators for foreign













Estonia 0.43 0.9 1.69
Hungary 0.74 0.658 1.67
Latvia 0.54 0.757 1.64
Lithuania 0.54 0.383 1.05
Poland 0.51 0.472 1.2
Slovenia 0.2 0.047 -1.27
In our data set we have six indicators that may pick up the relevance of reforms and political
freedom. Four indicators are constructed and published by the EBRD (EBRD transition report
1998, p. 27, 2001). The first three variables indicate reform, with higher values implying
more reforms. These indicators are: 1) reforms in the banking sector and interest rate
liberalization ( %$,-%$). Lower values indicate ‘little progress beyond establishment of the
                                                          
4
 A bank is considered foreign when more than 50% of the stocks is foreign owned.
5
 Excluded are cooperative banks, mortgage banks, saving banks (Beck et al, 1999)
8two-tier system.’ The highest values indicate ‘full convergence of banking laws and
regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive banking services’ and
several transition stages in between; 2) the transition of trade and the foreign exchange system
. %$,"$&; 3) the extent of transition within enterprises ( %$,- $&The fourth indicator
refers to the extent to which the economy has changed from public to private, measured by
the share of the private sector relative to the public sector (/$ *). Finally, we have a
measure for the degree of civil rights (*-!-($) and an indicator for the degree of democracy
(, 0#*) of the country(CIFP, 2002).With respect to the latter two variables, a higher value
implies a lower degree of civil rights or democracy.
Since the six variables are probably closely related, and may pick up several aspects
of the same issue (reforms and political democratization) we apply factor analysis to examine
whether the correlation between the (logarithms of the) six indicators can be explained in
terms of not observable factors. The factor analysis suggests that the six indicators can be
decomposed into two underlying factors, of which one mainly has to do with reforms
($ "#$0& and one mainly has to do with political freedom (/#(--*). The factor loadings
of the two factors are given in Table 3. Table 4 gives some information on $ "#$0and






( %$,- $ 0.923
( %$,-%$ 0.766 -0.202
( %$,"$ 0.801
(/$ * 0.824 -0.161
Chi Square: 5.99; Df=4; p-value=0.2; CUMVAR=0.73
Note: Factor loadings smaller than 0.1 are not reported. The Chi Square statistic tests the
hypothesis that the amount of factors taken into account (in this case 2) are sufficient versus the
alternative that more are required. Df denotes the degrees of freedom. The p-value reflects the
probability of incorrectly rejecting the null, so that a higher p-value gives more confidence that
the amount of factors is sufficient. CUMVAR gives the cumulative variance explained by the
factors taken into account. A ( before the variable names denotes the logarithm of that variable.













Note: for $ "#$0 a higher value reflects # reforms; for /#(--* a higher value
reflects ," freedom.
Table 4 shows that especially Hungary scores high on reforms. Croatia, Latvia, Slovenia and
Lithuania have the lowest scores. The Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland are a middle
group. With respect to /#(--*, the countries with the highest freedom are Lithuania,
Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Croatia is clearly on the other end of the
spectrum.
In the econometric analysis we control for different groups of variables that are
traditionally mentioned to be important for foreign bank entrance. To start with, the literature
suggests that the size and efficiency of the financial sector probably is an important pull factor
for foreign banks. For this reason, we try to construct a variable that measures the
development of the financial sector. Our data set includes seven indicators that may have
something to do with financial sector development. These variables are: 1) private credit by
deposit money bank assets over GDP (/$-!*&62)deposit money bank assets over GDP
(%')7,/&63) Deposit money bank assets over the sum of central bank assets and deposit
money bank assets (%')#(&6 4) the M2 to GDP ratio .07,/&; 5) stock market
capitalization in percentages of GDP (0$) *&; 6) the interest rate spread (/$ ,
lending minus deposit rate), and 7) the rate of inflation (-'"(&Again we use a factor analysis
to see whether there are some common underlying factors. This analysis shows that the seven
“financial sector” indicators can be decomposed into three underlying factors. A closer look at
the factorloadings for the three factors (see Table 5) shows that the first factor primarily has to
do with the size of the financial sector ("-'-8 &For this factor, especially the financial size
indicators (%')7,/9 (/$-!* and (07,/ are important. The second factor is very
much determined by /$ ,. This factor therefore reflects the efficiency of the financial
sector. Note that an increase in /$ ,corresponds to a decrease in the efficiency of the
financial sector. The third factor is the most difficult too explain. Especially market
capitalization is important. This factor seems to primarily reflect the importance of the stock
market. However, since also (%')#(9dealing with the relevance of deposit money, is
10








(0$) * 0.317 -0.476 0.627
/$ , -0.146 0.870
(07,/ 0.808 -0.446
(-'"( -0.592
Chi Square: 5.2; Df=3; p-value=0.158; CUMVAR=0.70
Note: see note Table 4
We also control for variables that are traditionally considered to be important indicators for
“follow the customer” and “attractiveness of the market” reasons. However, it is difficult to
clearly distinguish between a group of variables that primarily deals with “follow the
customer” and “attractiveness of the market” reasons. Moreover, these variables may be
highly correlated with each other. For these reasons we selected 7 variables often mentioned
to be important, and use a factor analysis to see whether these variables can be grouped in
terms of “follow the customer” or “attractiveness of the market” considerations. The variables
that we use are: 1) GDP per capita (7,//*); 2) the investment to GDP ratio (-'! ); 3)
the size of the population (/#/) ; 4) the ratio of foreign direct investments over GDP
(",-7,/); 5) the imports to GDP ratio (-0/7,/) ; 6) tariff revenues as a percentage of
imports ($-"") and 7) the trade to GDP ratio ($, ). The factor analysis on the
logarithms of these variables shows that a decomposition in three factors can be made. Table
6 shows the factorloadings for these factors.
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#/ '9-'! 	< (=
"*#$#/ ' "*#$-'!  "*#$1< (=
(7,//* 0.136 0.160 0.978
(-'!  0.186 0.982
(/#/ -0.887 0.127
(",-7,/ 0.125 0.379 -0.481
(-0/7,/ 0.922 0.341
($-"" -0.547 -0.281 0.386
($, 0.932 0.298
Chi Square: 4.34; Df=3; p-value=0.227; CUMVAR: 0.81
Note: see note Table 3.
The first factor has high factor loadings for ($, 9 (-0/7,/ and ($-"". This
suggests that the first factor mainly has to do with the openness of a country (#/ '). Since
the factor loading for (/#/ is also very high, but with a negative sign, there appears to be a
strong correlation between the openness of a country and the size of the population: countries
with a small population are more open. The second factor mainly has to do with the
investment rate (-'! ). The logarithm of GDP per capita has a very high factor loading on
the third factor. This seems to imply that Factor 3 mainly deals with wealth (< (=). It is
somewhat difficult to explain that (",-7,/ and ($-"" have high factorloadings on
factor 3. Apparently, the richer countries among the group of transition economies we
consider are more extensive users of import tariffs, and because of the import restrictions, are
less attractive for foreign investors. Note that traditional “follow the customer” variables like
(",-7,/and (-0/7,/ do not score high on the same underlying factor. This questions, to
some extent, the relevance of the usual distinction between “follow the customer” reasons and
“attractiveness of the market” reasons for explaining foreign bank entry.
Table 7 presents a correlation matrix for the main variables of the analysis. The
correlation matrix points at several interesting issues. First, the correlation coefficient
between $ "#$0 and "%') is very high. This gives some first evidence for the
importance of reforms for attracting foreign banks. Second, there is a very high correlation
between $ "#$0and "-' ""9which may imply that reforms have a strong positive impact
on the efficiency of the financial sector. The financial structure, reflected by "-'$, is also
highly correlated with $ "#$0. However, there does not seem to be a relationship between
reforms and the size of the financial sector ("-'-8 &. $ "#$0and -'! are also highly
correlated, suggesting a co-movement of reforms and domestic investments. Finally, there is a
12
high correlation between "%') and "-' "", -'!  and, too a lower extent, "-'$.
This suggests that reforms probably affect foreign bank entry via the efficiency of the
financial sector, the structure of the financial sector, and the amount of domestic investments.
In the next section, we will explicitly test this.
>*0?
"%') /#(--* $ "#$0 -'!  "-'-8 "-' "" "-'$ #/ ' < (=
"%')  1.00
/#(--* -0.35  1.00
$ "#$0  0.50 -0.02  1.00
-'!   0.41 -0.16  0.53  1.00
"-'-8 -0.14  0.08  0.08  0.45  1.00
"-' "" -0.48  0.35 -0.71 -0.32 -0.004  1.00
"-'$  0.20  0.20  0.27  0.54  0.08  0.002  1.00
#/ ' -0.03  0.07 -0.13  0.003 -0.03  0.29  0.54  1.00
< (= -0.30 -0.14 -0.16  0.001  0.64  0.11 -0.08  0.003  1.00
- %# %,%
This section presents regression results on the relevance of reforms for foreign bank entry.
The high correlation between various variables as reported in table 7, does not make it
possible to include all constructed explanatory variables in one regression. Therefore, the
estimated equations are specified as follows:
εϕγβα ++++∑= $ "#$0#/ '"-'-8 "%')
MLLL
where Lis a country specific constant for country i. i = (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia); and Π is an error term. Because of the high
correlation between $ "#$0 and "-' ""9"-'$ and -'! , the latter variables are -
for the time being - not included in the equation for foreign bank entry to avoid
multicollinearity problems. As we will argue below, it seems likely that foreign bank entry
will affect the efficiency and the structure of the financial system and domestic investment,
which may explain the high correlation between these variables and "%') reported in Table
7. Because of high multicollinearity between "-'-8 and < (=.see Table 7), only one







































adj. R2 0.59 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.64
Note: t-values in parentheses. The t-values are based on White Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors and covariances. The amount of observations for all equations is 54. The
country specific constants are not presented.
We start by considering the relevance of the overall indicators for reforms and political
freedom in attracting foreign banks. Table 8 presents the regression results. It follows that
reforms, measured by the factor $ "#$09have a significant impact on foreign bank entry.
This also holds, albeit to a lesser extent, for the political freedom factor (/#(--*). The
regressions also confirm the importance of the size of the financial sector and the openness of
a country. However, as is shown by equation 4, "-'-8 becomes insignificant if a variable
for the wealth of a country (< (=) is included. This is probably due to the high
collinearity between these two variables.
The regressions so far deal with “reduced form” effects of reforms on foreign bank
entry. Ultimately it is important to know via which channels reforms may attract foreign
banks. We make a first attempt to shed some more light on this issue by examining whether
reforms affect foreign bank entry by improving the efficiency of the financial sector, by
affecting the structure of the financial sector or by affecting domestic investments. The choice
for these channels is suggested by the high correlation coefficient between "-' ""9"-'$
and -'! , on the one hand, and $ "#$09on the other (see Table 7).
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Equation  % 2A 2B 3A 3B











































	A$ 0.62 0.65 0.19 0.73 0.44 0.60
Note: equations 1A and 1B (2A and 2B; 3A and 3B) are estimated as a system by three-stage least
squares. The amount of observations for all equations is 54. t-values between parentheses. Country
specific dummies are taken into account in all equations. Because of singularity problems, the country
dummy for Croatia is ignored in equations 1A, 2A and 3A. Due to multicollinearity (and also
singularity problems) $ "#$0is not added in the equations for foreign bank entry.
Equations 1A and 1B show that reforms significantly affect foreign bank entry via the
efficiency of the financial sector. Remember, that a decrease in "-' "" reflects an increase
in efficiency. Political reforms appear to have a direct effect on foreign bank entry, but not via
the efficiency of the financial sector. Reforms also appear to attract foreign banks due to a
positive effect on the financial structure ("-'$ equations 2A and 2B) and domestic
investment (-'! equations 3A and 3B).
15
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This paper examines whether reforms and political freedom are important for foreign bank
entry for a group of 8 transition economies. We first test the relevance of six individual
indicators. Next, we construct an overall reform and political freedom variable by applying a
factor analysis on the six individual indicators, and consider the relationship between these
two factors and foreign bank entry. The regression results provide strong evidence that
foreign bank entry positively responds to reform measures. We also find some evidence for
the importance political freedom. Moreover, we make a first attempt to understand via which
channels reforms attract foreign banks, and find that reforms significantly affect foreign bank
entry via the efficiency of the financial sector, the structure of the financial sector and by
having a positive effect on domestic investments. Clearly, more research, is needed to exactly
figure out why and how foreign banks react to economic reforms. It also is important to
examine under which circumstances foreign bank entry is beneficial for a country, an issue
that has not been addressed in this paper. Nonetheless, the results of our empirical analyses
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/0%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2  (, &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VFORB Value of assets of foreign deposit money banks divided by the
value of assets of all banks
ACE Database (Bol et al., 2002)
NFORB Total number of foreign banks divided by total number of
banks
ACE Database (Bol et al., 2002)

 '( )* 
EBRDIBR Reform in the banking sector and interest rate liberalisation
Dummy variable with range 1-4
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
EBRDFR The transition of trade and the foreign exchange system
Dummy variable with range 1-4
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
EBRDIER Extent of transition within enterprises
Dummy variable with range 1-4
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
PRSEC Share of the private sector relative to the public sector European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
CIVILR Degree of civil and political rights
Dummy variable with range 1-9
CIFP country indicators for foreign policy; website:
http:/www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs
DEMOC Degree of democracy
Dummy variable with range 1-9
CIFP country indicators for foreign policy; website:
http:/www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs
3 &# 
4		3 4, ,&# 
PRIVATC Private credit by deposit money banks divided by GDP ACE Database (Bol et al., 2002)
BANKGDP Deposit money bank assets divided by GDP ACE Database (Bol et al., 2002)
BANKTOTAL Deposit money bank assets divided by the sum of central bank
assets and deposit money bank assets
ACE Database (Bol et al., 2002)
M2GDP M2 divided by GDP Worldbank development indicators CD-ROM and World
development Report 2002, 2000/2001, 1999/2000.
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MARKETC Stock market capitalization in percentages of GDP European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
2  (, & 
SPREAD Lending minus deposit rate Worldbank development indicators CD-ROM and World
development Report 2002, 2000/2001, 1999/2000
INFL The rate of inflation Worldbank development indicators CD-ROM and World
development Report 2002, 2000/2001, 1999/2000
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  ,%%6 
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  ,%&&* 
	
3   ,%% 
GDPPC GDP per capita, in US Dollars European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
INVEST Investment rate divided by GDP European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
POP The size of the population, in millions European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
FDIGDP Foreign direct investment divided by GDP European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
IMPGDP Imports divided by GDP European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
TARIFF Tariff revenues divided by imports European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
TRADE Trade divided by GDP European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD,
2001, 1998)
4
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* Indicators are constructed by the use of factor analysis.
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